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I Abstract 
The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number 
of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to 
provide assurances to the international community regarding 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States' 
adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty 
commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the 
best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear 
material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the 
importance of safeguards-oriented R&D, especially targeting 
improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, 
materials and activities, initiated a number of activities 
in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member 
State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with 
known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant 
reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to 
identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. 
In support of this objective, the United States Support 
Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on "Advanced I 
i Sensors for Safeguards" in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 
I 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a 
i ! U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and 
facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help 
the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards 
implementation. The workshop, which was attended by 
representatives of seven member states and international 
organizations, included presentations by technology holders 
and developers on new technologies thought to have 
relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use 
by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by 
facilitated breakout sessions where the participants 
considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors 
might face in the field. One scenario focused on an 
enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research 
reactor. The participants brainstormed using the 
technologies presented by the participants and other 
technologies known to them to propose techniques and 
methods that could be used by the IAEA to strengthen 
safeguards. Creative thinking was encouraged during 
discussion of the proposals. On the final day of the 
workshop, the OAC facilitators summarized the participant's 
ideas in a combined briefing. 
This paper will report on the results of the Aprll 2007 
USSP-IAEA Workshop on Advanced Sensors for Safeguards and 
give an overview of the proposed technologies of greatest 
promise. 
Workshop Objectives 
The workshop was held April 23-27, 2007, in Santa Fe, NM. 
It was attended by representatives of the U.S. Support 
Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP), including the Subgroup 
on Safeguards Technical Support and the International 
Safeguards Project Office (ISPO), the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), other IAEA Member State Support 
Programs (MSSPs), U.S. national laboratories, companies and 
academia. Seven countries were represented. The workshop 
organizers encouraged the attendance of people who had no 
previous connection with the IAEA Department of Safeguards. 
This was to ensure the presentation and discussion of new 
ideas. The meeting was sponsored by the USSP and organized 
by the International Safeguards Project Office in 
cooperation with Organizational Analysis Corporation (OAC). 
OAC provided facilitation for the workshop working groups. 
The workshop was intended to build on the October 2005 
USSP-IAEA Workshop on Safeguards Tools for the Future. 1 
This preceding Workshop addressed mainly data processing, 
data communications, and data security and information 
technology- (IT-) related infrastructure. The possiblllty 
of addressing sensors was considered in the plannlng phase 
in 2005, but it was decided to focus on the IT part. 
During the sensors workshop, the IAEA wanted to uncover and 
discuss the capabilities required by the IAEA now and in 
' Department of Safeguards Worl~shop on Safeguards Tools of tile Future, Decembe~ 2005, ISPO Repol I 
#524. 
the future, advantages and disadvantages of prospective 
technology solutions, and to prioritize the technology 
recommendations while considering the constraints under 
which the IAEA operates. 
The IAEA also wanted to address the objectives identified 
in its Medium Term Strategy Goals for 2006-2011. 
Workshop Agenda 
The workshop was conducted over a period of four-and-a-half 
days. The first day started with a keynote speech by 
Leonard Weiss of Stanford University's Center for 
International Security and Cooperation. Dr. Weiss was the 
architect of the U.S. Nonproliferation Act of 1978, and he 
shared his perspective on issues facing IAEA Safeguards 
now. 
Dr. Weiss' speech was followed by several presentations by 
IAEA staff on the mission and challenges of the IAEA 
Department of Safeguards. These presentations were 
important for those attendees who had not previously worked 
with the IAEA. 
One-and-a-half days were set aside for invited technical 
presentations. These are discussed in the following 
section of this paper. 
The foregoing was preparation for two scenarios or 
brainstorming sessions. The meeting participants were 
divided into three working groups, each with its own 
facilitator, to consider two scenarios for which the IAEA 
is challenged to identify safeguards approaches. The first 
scenario involved clandestine enrichment activities at a 
declared location. The second scenario addressed 
clandestine production of plutonium at a declared nuclear 
research site that includes a research reactor. Each 
scenario was considered by the working groups in a half day 
session. The working groups were asked to be creative in 
their thinking to identify solutions to the IAEA's needs. 
The meeting closed with the OAC facilitators each 
presenting their working groups' findings and 
recommendations. The results of these working groups are 
discussed later in this paper. 
I Technologies Presented I The technologies that were presented at the workshop are 
too numerous to discuss in this paper, but they are 
., 
discussed in detail in the workshop report2 and are 
available for viewing on the ISPO ~ e b s i t e . ~  A complete 
listing of the presentations is provided in Table 1, and a 
few of the technologies thought to have promise are 
discussed below. 
The IAEA has a need to detect subsurface structures and 
hidden entries into,containers. Stephen Mersch of Point 
Source, Inc., presented Speckle Photography. Speckle 
Photography, which is known by a number of names, provides 
a means of detecting hidden underground structures or other 
non-visible items. The system uses subtle differences in 
surface response to light. It requires significant 
interpretive analysis that is not yet well established. 
Power management is a constraint on the IAEA's use of 
unattended monitoring systems. Larry Gadeken of BetaBatt, 
Inc., presented Betavoltaic Energy Conversion and Storage. 
This technology uses very efficient betavoltaic 
semiconductor devices to capture energy from beta particles 
emitted by tritium. A silicon wafer is chemically processed 
to produce deep micron-sized pores on the wafer. The energy 
conversi0.n layer is fabricated in the pore space by 
diffusing p-n junctions into the pore walls. The pores are 
subsequently infiltrated with a Tritiated polymer. Beta 
particles emitted by the Tritium strike the p-n junctions 
resulting in the production of electricity continuously for 
12 or more years. 
The IAEA has an identified need to verify spent fuel. 
Shireen Adenwalla of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 
presented Boron Carbide Based Neutron Detectors. Most 
materials have a tiny capture cross section for neutrons. 
Boron carbide is a semiconductor with a large capture cross 
section and promising material for neutron detection. The 
technology is still under development with 
commercialization expected in two to five years. Boron 
carbide crystals are expected to cost approximately ten 
U.S. dollars. 
Depament of Safeguards International Safeguards Workshop for Sensors foi Adva~iccd Sa fcg~~a~ds ,  
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Robert Krause, of Los Alamos National Laboratory, presented 
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR). NMR provides a 
quantitative measure of the number of nuclei of a given 
isotope in a given sample. LANL developed a means for 
measuring the NMR signature of materials in ultra-low 
magnetic fields and at ultra-low frequencies. Applications 
include UFs flow monitoring, measuring 2 3 5 ~  and 2 3 8 ~  in 
enrichment monitoring, and UFs cylindex measurements. The 
benefits of NMR are that it is non-intrusive and no source 
is required. This technology was considered by the workshop 
participants to be revolutionary and the top priority for 
further study. 
Table 1: List of Workshop Presentations 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
"Nonproliferation a i d  Safeguards Then and Now" by Leonard We~ss 
SAFEGUARDS PRESENTATIONS 
1. Opening Rema&, by Nikolai Kldebnikov 
2. The Mission of the IAEA's Deparhnent of Safeguards, by Wan Soo Park 
3. IAEA Safeguards Equipment, by Manfred Zendel and Martin Moeslu~ger 
4. Reseach and Development Activities at the IAEA, by Belllard Wishard/Julian Whichello 
5. Sensor Information and IAEA Safeguards Condusioii, by M. Lieskovsky/Tun Ayers 
6. The U.S. Support Program (USSP) to IAEA Safeguards, by Albert Queirolo 
TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS 
1. New types of Unattended Systems for Enrichment Plant Safeguards, by Mark Pickrell, et. al. 
2. Speckle Photography for Revealing Hidden Structures, by Steve Mel-sch 
3. Boron Carbide Based Neutron Detectors, by Shireen Adenwalla, et, al. 
4. A System for Simultaneous Beta and Gamma Spectroscopy and its Application to Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation, by D.M. Hamby, et. al. 
5. Advancements ui High Resolution Gamma-Ray Detector Deployment, by Sam Hitch 
6. Superconducting Ultra-High Energy Resolution Ganuna-Ray a i d  Neutron Spectro~iieters, by 
Stephan Friedrich 
7. Novel Concept for a Directional Fast Neutron Detector, by D. Stuenkel, et. al. 
8. Application of I m a g q  for Nonproliferation and Safeguards, by Yu Hasliimoto 
9. Multi-Isotope Process Monitor for Reprocessing Plants, by J. Schwaites, et. al. 
10. Monitoring Solutions for Nuclear Materials Safeguards, by S. McEhauey, et. al. 
11. Triliated 3D Diode Betavoltaic Microbattery, by Larry Gadeken 
12. Front-End Electronics for Thermal Neutron Detectors, by Kiril Ianakiev et, al. 
13. Improving the Accuracy of an Uranium Enrichment Monitor Based on a NaI(T1) Spectrouleter 
and Traismission Source, by Kiril Ianakiev, et. al. 
14. A Solid-state Hand-held Neutron Radiation Sensor by Sina Balkir 
15. Use of Acoustic Wave Analysis for Safeguards Applications, by Michael Goldfarb, et. al. 
16. Design for Stand-off Radiation Detector System Using Compton Scattering, by D. Stuenkel, et. 
al. 
17. Standoff Detection and Identification of Nuclear Materials by Passive FTIR Radiometry, by 
Eldon Puckrin, et. al. 
18. Investigation of Ultra-Low Field Nuclear Magnetic Resonance for UF6 Flow Measu~.ernents, by 
Robert Kraus, Jr., et. al. 
19. Modern Safeguard Systems, by Chris Pickett, et, al. 
20. Development of Sic Schottky Diode Detectors as an Advanced Sensor for Safeguards by 
Measurement of Actinide Concentrations in Molten Salt Electrolyte, by Thomas Blue, et. al. 
Summary of Brainstorming Sessions 
The working groups considered two scenarios. The first 
scenario involved clandestine enrichment activities at a 
declared location. The second scenario addressed 
clandestine production of plutonium at a declared nuclear 
research site that includes a research reactor. 
The working groups were composed of IAEA staff members, 
member state representatives, Member State Support Program 
representatives, national laboratory, company and 
university representatives, and government employees. The 
participants shared their particular expertise to address 
the problems presented by the scenarios. 
Enrichment Activities 
The participants identified a number of shortfalls in the 
IAEA1.s ability to detect undeclared enrichment activities. 
Existing tools are sometimes too bulky and heavy, making 
them 'impractical for inspectors to carry. In addition, 
continuing training is required for inspectors to be 
comfortable using the variety of equipment they are 
expected to use on inspections. The training reduces their 
availability to conduct inspections but is essential to 
their collecting credible data. 
Current tools leave the IAEA unable to detect the 
overproduction of low enriched uranlurn or the existence of 
remote piping that may be feeding clandestine facilities. 
The IAEA is limited by the accuracy of its instruments. 
Improved accuracy would strengthen the IAEA's ability to 
verify conclusively the flow and inventory of nuclear 
material. 
The working groups made the following observations and 
recommendations: 
Accurately measuring the material balance is important 
in order to address diversion 
NMR could be a revolutionary technology for 
safeguards. 
The IAEA should also consider gamma ray tomography, 
tunable diode lasers, sampling of vacuum system cold 
traps, active neutron interrogation, and portable 
swipe sampling. 
Research Site with Reactor 
Some of the challenges and shortfalls for this scenario 
were similar to those identified for enrichment activities 
The IAEA's existing tools are sometimes too bulky and 
heavy, and continuing training is required for inspectors 
to be comfortable using the variety of equipment they are 
expected to use on inspections. 
Currently available tools leave the IAEA unable to detect 
partial defects of core and spent fuel, and give the IAEA 
no means to detect irradiated targets. Moreover, the IAEA 
is aware that the on-site power monitors that track the 
reactor operation history could be defeated, making the 
IAEA unable to independently estlmate the plutonium 
production. 
The working groups made the following observations and 
recommendations: 
Clandestine production of plutonium is the major 
concern with research reactors. 
Existing technologies could help but are not 
acceptable to the member states due to intrusiveness 
or the nature of data transmission. 
Advanced sensors should be smaller and detect 
unexpected materials and changes in physical 
configurations. 
Portable mass spectrometry could be used for detection 
of plutonium production. 
A portable environmental sampling analysis and 
recording system would allow inspectors to follow-up 
on findings while still on site, rather than making a 
follow-up trip. 
A high-resolution gamma system could be used for on- 
site identification of actinides. 
A portable information system and communication device 
could provide reference materials for inspectors to 
use and allow them to get back-up support from their 
IAEA colleagues during inspections. [This 
recommendation was also made during the October 2005 
Workshop on Safeguards Tools for the Future.] 
I IAEA Follow-Up Action Plan 
Following the workshop, OAC and the IAEA comp~led a 
workshop report. The report summarizes the workshop 
content, including the technical presentations, and 
documents the recommendations that were made during the 
brainstorming and close out sessions. 
The IAEA Department of Safeguards will conduct an in-house 
review of the results of the meeting. The workshop was 
well-timed in that the IAEA is updatlng the Agency's R&D 
Programme for 2008/2009 and the recommendations that are 
accepted by the IAEA can be included in the Programme, 
which will address new and novel technologies. Once the 
R&D Program is updated, the IAEA can submit requests to its 
MSSPs for assistance in addressing the recommendations. 
I Conclusion 
The Workshop on Advanced Sensors for Safeguards was held in 
Santa Fe, NM, April 23-27, 2007. The participants 
recommended technologies that could be used by the IAEA to 
strengthen safeguards. The IAEA will review the technical 
ideas and, if found to be valid, the IAEA will include them 
in the R&D Program. Technology that is already available 
will be tested and/or further developed under appropriate 
MSSP collaborations. The final technology recommendations 
will be sent to all MSSPs for comment and consideration. 
The IAEA is considering a future workshop that will focus 
on integration of the IT drlven October 2005 workshop wlth 
this hardware-oriented workshop. 
